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Honorable William J. Casey
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Bill:

In the past few months, our Center's been asked a dozen times: "Should the U.S. begin to think about an alternative or 'fall-back' strategy, if trends in Europe get much worse?"

NSIC favors doing everything possible to support pro-American elements in Europe who want to save NATO. In fact, we're expanding that part of our program. On the other hand, it may also be time for some quiet contingency planning both for modifications within the NATO structure and for collective security elsewhere. If you have a view about this, or have seen a relevant article, we'd like to have it.

Meanwhile, the enclosure is an up-dated version of my draft proposal to create a new naval alliance to defend the oil and mineral "lifelines" in the southern oceans. Of course, this is not meant as a substitute for NATO. Rather, it suggests the need to link Russia's "three fronts" and bring Japan into full partnership for mutual defense.

With best regards, I am

Faithfully,

Frank

Frank R. Barnett

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A new strategy for the West

Frank R. Barnett

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A new strategy for the West

Frank R Barnett

IN SOME POLITICAL circles there is euphoria over the apparent quality, élan and competence of the national security staff of United States President Ronald Reagan's Republican administration. But this should not be allowed to obscure the fact that a minimum of five years will be required by America before credible equality can be achieved with the assets and techniques of conflict now held by the Soviet Union. It is, of course, myopic to regard 'catching up with the Russians' as necessarily matching numbers: missile for missile, tank for tank, ship for ship. Indeed, logic might suggest that a nation such as the United States should seek to play 'scientific leap-frog' by way of quantum jumps in design and technology, rather than risk its high-technology edge at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) table. Even so, one can scarcely ignore the way in which the power balance, changed in favour of the Soviets by sheer weight of numbers, has widened the diplomatic options available to the Kremlin. Between 1968 and 1980, Russia's military investment outpaced that of the United States by at least US$120 billion and perhaps as much as $200 billion.

Paradoxically, the era of the 'cold war' was relatively safe for America and her allies. During the years that Josef Stalin and Nikita Khrushchev held supreme office in Russia, that is the two decades following the end of World War II, the United States enjoyed clear superiority in nuclear weapons, sea power and strategic delivery systems. When President Dwight Eisenhower was in the White House, three-quarters of the globe was effectively closed to Russian expansion. Moreover, strategic superiority enabled a succession of American presidents to frustrate the Soviets in regional crises such as the blockade of West Berlin in 1949, the threat to Lebanon in 1958, and the installation of Russian missiles in Cuba four years later. But today, after a decade of SALT and détente, the dangers to the United States and its allies have significantly increased. First, America exchanged military superiority for parity, hoping by such restraint to set an example for Russia. Then — as the Soviets reached for superiority in some categories of weaponry — the United States sought refuge in the dubious semantics of 'essential equivalence'. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union has created the clear capability of moving from Stalin's guiding principle, defence of the homeland, to the doctrine of Admiral of the Fleet Sergei Gorshkov, commander of the Russian Navy: the projection of power overseas to all oceans and continents. Now, in an era of détente, the West confronts a relentless Soviet military build-up that knows no peace time parallel since the fabrication of the Nazi war machine in Germany. The Soviet Union is putting 16 to 20 per cent of its gross national product into weaponry, military manpower, and research and development on new systems — a sum far in excess of that needed if its sole concern were prudent safeguards for the defence of Mother Russia.

Thus, when the Reagan administration took office in January 1981 it was confronted with the task of overcoming inherited problems in the area of national security affairs:

- the vulnerability of America's land-based nuclear deterrents in the early 1980s, and the consequent opening of a Soviet military 'window of opportunity' that through sustained and vigorous

American effort can only be closed by about 1986 at the earliest

- a growing military advantage in conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact over the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO), linked to an increasing reluctance of many of America's European allies to up-grade theatre [regional] nuclear defence
- the lengthening shadow of the Soviet navy (with Cuban and East German commandos) in the southern hemisphere, which constitutes the source or supply route of those oil and minerals that sustain the economies of Japan and 'NATO-Europe' and foster American industrial health
- disabling of United States intelligence services, at a time when the KGB is enlarging its world-wide offensives of propaganda, dis-information and covert operations
- erosion of the industrial base of United States defence, to such an extent that the once-vaunted arsenal of democracy has lost much of its 'surge capacity' — the ability rapidly to turn to mass production of tanks, aircraft and the other heavy equipment of warfare
- sapping of friends' and allies' confidence in America's capacity and will to meet the full range of threats from the Soviet Union and its expanding Marxist commonwealth.

It is, of course, a matter of doubt whether a democracy, short of declaring war, can ever design and implement a grand strategy. Critics argue that, despite his anti-Soviet rhetoric, President Reagan has not yet done so. But it is undeniable that his principal captains have already taken significant steps in a new direction. The Congress has approved a two-year increase in the defence budget of 28 per cent after inflation, and the Reagan administration's plan to spend $1 300 billion on armaments in the five years 1981 to 1986 represents a noteworthy effort to close the gap opened during a one-sided détente in which the Soviets alone engaged in an arms race.

Moreover, the Pentagon is moving away from the 'NATO short-war only' focus resulting from America's Vietnam débâcle: it no longer functions in anticipation of a threat consisting solely of a high-intensity Soviet assault on Europe and/or strategic nuclear war. While continuing to prepare for such 'worst case' scenarios, it recognises in its contingency planning that protracted conflict in other theatres may





demand more mobile forces with lighter equipment, and a need for renewing stockpiles to support such a campaign in the Persian Gulf, Africa, southern Asia or the Caribbean. There is growing awareness, too, that America needs a 'three-ocean' navy, especially since Persian Gulf oilfields are less than 1 600 kilometres from the Soviet border. So far there is little sentiment in favour of any replacement for the defunct Central Treaty Organisation (Cento) in south west Asia, hence a lack of large-scale bases in the region may limit American intervention to small 'trip-wire' deployments of troops near the Gulf. Given current limits on America's airlift capacity, those more substantial forces that could be flown in during a crisis might be overrun in the absence of the conspicuous further deterrent provided by regional naval supremacy. In that connection, the presence of French and other European warships in the Indian Ocean raises the odds against Soviet adventurism; looking to the future, one would not need the brilliance of an Admiral Mahan to argue that United States access to the big South African naval base at Simonstown and the addition of even a few Japanese ships to Indian Ocean routes could change political and psychological attitudes enough to make the defence of the Persian Gulf more feasible. Western Europe, admittedly, is less than eager to make any formal commitment to this theatre, and Japan continues to resist American pressure to increase its self-defence forces and broaden their operating scope. But to those concerned with Western defence in the face of Moscow's commitment of its power to intervene in unstable Third World territories, it is evident that the status quo is intolerable. There can be little doubt that America under President Reagan will fight for its own vital interests. But when those of, say, Japan are even more endangered, Americans cannot be expected to fight alone. Russia's grand strategy is founded on the mutual support of military sub-systems in four continents. North Korean pilots, Cuban legions, Czechoslovakian arms dealers, élite battalions from North Vietnam, East German secret police, and terrorists financed by Libya are among the interchangeable assets that can be manipulated by Soviet conflict brokers. The forces of once landlocked Russia can now extend from Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam to the Caribbean, and

embrace the Indian Ocean in between. In Stalin's day, it was a communist boast that 'the front is everywhere'. But that claim was limited to propaganda, espionage and subversion; today, it is Russian tanks that can be speedily committed in such remote salients as Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Vietnam and Angola. Since Moscow's strategy is now inter-continental, at least two propositions merit careful study by those nations imperilled by Russian expansion.

First: while it is imperative to up-grade conventional and theatre nuclear defences vis-à-vis those of the Warsaw Pact, in the end NATO cannot be defended entirely from within the strict limits of its own territory. Sixty per cent of the world's oil supply is virtually encircled by military allies of the Soviet Union in the shape of South Yemen, Ethiopia, Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. Communists and other anti-Western groups may well prove aggressive participants in what may turn out to be the next stage of Iran's revolution — the crisis of the Khomeini succession. The southern third of Africa, the 'Saudi Arabia of minerals', is either in the hands of governments sympathetic to Marxism or under seige from Marxist guerrillas. Surely, NATO cannot be sustained if the links of a shadow Soviet commonwealth are fashioned in such a way that in the long run they strangle the trade flow of the United States, Europe and Japan at Third World choke points of seaborne commerce.

Second: a war in Europe launched by Russia would not necessarily be restricted to Europe. The United States is a Pacific power as well as a NATO member, and no prudent Soviet planner, intent on invading Europe, could ignore the peril of back-door strikes into Russia from American fleets and bases in the Pacific and Japan. Moreover, Soviet war plans would almost certainly impel Moscow to accompany any invasion of Europe with a thrust aimed at seizing the Persian Gulf and interdicting the Cape of Good Hope sea route, in order to shut off NATO's oil lifeline. Hence, if waged for even three weeks at a conventional level, what might have begun as a European war would almost certainly spread elsewhere; and Japan, South Africa and Saudi Arabia, among other states, might well find themselves collateral targets of a Soviet assault on NATO.

THE inter-dependence of Russia's 'three fronts' — NATO to the west, Japan and the People's Republic of China to the east, Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to the south — may apply as surely in military matters as in trade, commerce and energy. If so, Washington's so-called 'swing' strategy of despatching its Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic if the Soviet Union attacks NATO, must give way to the 'tri-ocean' strategy of a formidable Western naval presence in all sectors. This cannot, of course, be the sole means of checking Soviet ambition. Fleets move under nuclear umbrellas, and to preserve this shield the United States must take immediate steps to safeguard its land-based nuclear deterrent, which will become vulnerable within the next two to four years. But the West as a whole must also understand that the new factor in geo-politics is the global reach of Russia's *conventional* weapons. When Chairman Khrushchev rattled his rockets, the West could call his bluff. It was nuclear attack or nothing for the Kremlin; in those days, Moscow could not project limited military power into Africa, south Asia or Latin America. But today, Chairman Leonid Brezhnev can behave with all the assurance of a Czar married to a Queen Victoria. Not even the Caribbean, gateway to the oil treasures of Mexico and Venezuela, is beyond the reach of Admiral Gorshkov's naval power.

Moscow is not, as Secretary of State Alexander Haig (unlike some of his predecessors) is keenly aware, so preoccupied with command of the sea-lanes as to neglect the nourishment of the urban guerrilla and the peasant revolutionary — the strategy of terror and its application through 'wars of liberation'. Diplomats may celebrate the alleged evolution of the Cold War into détente; but whoever rules Russia, Lenin still lives in the Politburo. To the Leninist mind, ideological combat is not empty rhetoric but rather a practical means of winning political power in the desert and jungle precincts of the Third World. Leninism means Soviet weapons for proxy warriors, and training in the arts of psychological warfare and dis-information. It also means persistence in conflict management. As Lenin might have put it: 'One step backward in Egypt; two steps forward in Angola and Moçambique; three steps forward with Soviet bases in Libya, Ethiopia and Afghanistan; and continue the struggle to change the balance of forces in Iran.' Brezhnev's advisers may even have gone one better than Lenin in devising a scheme to 'pyramid' foreign combat assets, using Cuba's manpower to throw a net over a neighbouring country so that in due course large numbers of soldiers from, say, Nicaragua will also be available as janissaries of the Soviet Union.

Some Western élites — in questions of *Realpolitik* prone to seeing mirror images of

themselves — seem to assume that Soviet leaders are essentially Russian-speaking graduates of the Harvard Business School. If that were true, diplomats ought to be able to manipulate Moscow with credits, cost-benefit analyses and gentlemen's agreements. But the Leninist mind uses the cost-accounting of the battlefield, not the board-room.

IN estimating Soviet objectives and capabilities, it should be understood that profound cultural differences can make for diverse priorities. If a nation's political heritage runs from Magna Carta through Locke and Jefferson, its values are not quite the same as those of that society whose legacy derives from Genghis Khan through Ivan the Terrible to Lenin. Not that strategic planners can precisely infer the intentions of the Politburo simply by reading Lenin. But Lenin is not dead gospel; his works are at least as relevant to the behaviour of the commissars as is the doctrine of the Harvard Business School to the decision-making process of an American chief executive. We are entitled, therefore, to take seriously a Leninist dictum that is given concrete shape by Soviet allocation of manpower and resources to an indirect assault on the West's economic infra-structure: that the Achilles heel of the capitalist economy lies in what used to be called 'the colonies' and is now known as the Third World. "Sever the raw materials flow from the colonies," argued Lenin, "and you cut the spinal cord of the Empire." In Soviet professional journals and in major speeches by Khrushchev and Brezhnev, there have been clear references to an up-dated version of this thesis.

Six months before he was confirmed in his post, Secretary of State Haig warned a committee of the United States Congress that "the era of the resource war has arrived". Much information has been compiled to support that view, not least by business groups in London, Paris, Pittsburgh and Washington. The evidence contradicts those who posit that the policy of the United States, Europe and Japan must be geared either to the 'east-west' confrontation or the 'north-south' inter-action. What West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt has called 'the struggle for the world product' means that the east-west conflict increasingly will take place on a north-south axis and, almost certainly, at the level of low-intensity combat rather than nuclear war. General William C. Westmoreland, a former Chief of Staff, United States Army, has said: "The most likely real-world threat facing America today is not the nuclear forces of the Soviet Union, and not the Warsaw Pact forces facing NATO. It is the threat posed by an ever-increasing number of countries subservient to the Soviet Union, the control of bases along our raw material supply routes and the potential of terrorism, propaganda and even military and naval incursion by the Soviet Union or their [*sic*] surrogates against targets important to our economy."

Western businessmen and military strategists who assert the reality of a dawning resource war can find supporting evidence for their view both in Soviet naval deployments and in statements from Russian leaders. In a book entitled *Strategy and Economics*, Soviet Major General A.N. Lagovskiy has termed America's dependence on certain strategic materials from abroad the 'weak link' in American military capability. Lagovskiy argued for a Soviet effort to control such strategic materials as a means of exerting influence on the health of the American economy.

The attempt to debilitate the Western industrial economies by depriving them of their raw material imports is now firmly implanted in Soviet doctrine. Chairman Khrushchev supported the resource war against the West in a speech at Jakarta University on February 22 1960: "Afro-Asian countries play an essential part in limiting aggression in an economic respect. They are important suppliers of raw materials for the Western powers. The supporters of aggression understand that when the majority of Afro-Asian countries follow a peace-loving policy they are unable to count on the use of the rich resources of Afro-Asian countries in their aggressive plans." Robert Moss, former editor of the 'Foreign Report' intelligence bulletin of *The Economist*, recently commented on a statement by Mr Brezhnev on the importance of the resource war to Soviet politico-military objectives: "Leonid Brezhnev told a secret meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders in Prague in 1973 that the Soviet objective was world dominance by the year 1985, and that *the control of Europe's sources of energy and raw materials would reduce it to the condition of a hostage to Moscow*" (my italics).

There can be little doubt that, in practice, Soviet-style geo-politics, backed by Russia's navy, poses a threat to the raw materials supplies of the non-communist industrialised states of the northern hemisphere. From Moscow's viewpoint, an undeclared resource war is low cost, low casualty, low visibility and (despite some successful counter-moves by France in Africa) usually below the threshold of effective NATO response. Moreover, the twilight battles of this ambiguous conflict do not put at risk the population,

farms and factories of Russia; indeed they do not interrupt the eastward flow of grain, technology and credits which strengthens the Soviet Union even as it weakens the West. Not Clausewitz, nor Machiavelli, nor even Sun-Tzu could have devised a more oblique and efficacious gambit.

ASSUMING hostile intent and resource war capacity on the part of Moscow, are the Western powers really so vulnerable? Is the threat not a hollow one? Unfortunately, evidence to the contrary is overwhelming. William J. Casey, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), told the United States Chamber of Commerce in April 1980 that "others far from our borders can put their hands on our economic throttles and on our economic throats". It was that sort of premise that prompted Mr Reagan, in October 1980, before the presidential election, to appoint a 'strategic minerals task force'. This was a long step towards American recognition that the West (plus Japan) not only depends on energy from overseas, but in terms of minerals is in danger of becoming a 'have-not' grouping. Indeed, within this decade we may face the creation of cartels along the lines of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), that will manipulate the market in non-fuel minerals.

To oversimplify, the northern hemisphere depends for a critical proportion of its industrial raw materials on the southern half of the globe: the United States for roughly 50 per cent, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and Europe for about 75 per cent, and Japan for virtually 90 per cent. (American dependence may be overstated: the country has synthetic materials and low-grade ores it could use in an emergency, albeit at painful cost. But western Europe and Japan are singularly vulnerable.) At present, the defence industry's operations and the economic viability of the United States rest on the importation of some two dozen non-fuel minerals. The country is more than 90 per cent dependent on 13 of them (chrome, cobalt, manganese, tantalum, platinum group metals, and so on) and more than 50 per cent dependent on another 13. Without access to reliable foreign supplies of raw materials, the United States cannot make tanks, bombers, missiles, jet engines, machine tools, computers, television equipment, crankshafts, gears or drilling bits — just to begin the list. Consumer interests would be crippled just as surely as defence production; indeed, the whole way of life of advanced capitalism would be jeopardised if Russia could give effect to a 'denial strategy'.

True, there are still untapped resources in the American west and Alaska and the deep floors of the oceans. The United States has some room for manoeuvre. It can expand and up-grade minerals stockpiles and increase its domestic production by changing environmental regulations and removing ore-rich lands from the list of official 'wilderness' tracts at present closed to mining companies. Europe and Japan, however, do not have these options; their economic well-being is inextricably intertwined with supplies from the Third World.

Since Russia — unlike the United States — is largely self-sufficient in basic materials, Moscow does not need the far-flung battle fleets of a four-ocean navy to protect its access to overseas resources. Why, then, so many Soviet surface warships and

submarines? Why a new naval base at Cam Ranh Bay? Why a Cuban 'foreign legion'? Perhaps it is not to secure Russia's own, but to deny others' access to raw materials. Seen from this perspective, the 1975 independence struggle in Angola was not a minor tribal scuffle; instead, it may have been an opening campaign in the resource war. The casualties of that kind of conflict could include millions of unemployed in the streets of Europe — the human potential for a second and possibly engulfing wave of Euro-communism — and the consequence for Japan could be even more disastrous.

It is self-evident that the market economies of the northern hemisphere are closely linked

Bitter American experience in Vietnam (above and left) contributed to reluctance to plan for anything other than a short, north west European conflict with Soviet Union. Loss of Vietnam opened bases at Da Nang and Can Ranh Bay as links in modern Russian navy's considerable 'blue water' capability

to each other; conspicuous industrial failure and mass unemployment cannot be isolated within one of them. Even if the United States could obtain, for example, all the cobalt it needed from abandoned mines in Idaho, the American government could not ignore the interest of Japan and Europe in promoting stability in Zaïre to maintain their supplies of the mineral. A 'security of supply' concept, therefore, must animate any policy that seeks to sustain alliances, and America's resource strategy must take into account the needs of its allies as well as the rights of supplier nations.

Much doubt has been expressed as to whether raw materials cartels other than OPEC can sustain themselves against wealthy industrial nations which are able to turn to substitutes, synthetics or alternative sources. Oil is sometimes thought to be the only indispensable item; and certainly some studies show there would be great difficulty in holding together cartels for copper, iron ore, bauxite, tin and natural rubber. Sources of chromium, platinum, nickel, cobalt, gold and industrial diamonds, however, are fewer, with the Soviet Union and southern Africa enjoying positions of peculiar dominance. If, for example, régimes sympathetic to Moscow should come to power in southern Africa, the Soviet Union would control 90 per cent of the supply of

several minerals which underpin millions of jobs in the northern hemisphere and for which no feasible substitutes exist at present.

Moreover, orthodox analysis of the economic utility of resource cartels tends to assume that they would be aimed at commercial profit alone, not political objectives. Such analysis omits the Leninist incentive. Soviet-inspired economic warfare would not have to be profit-orientated in order to achieve Moscow's goal of creating financial chaos and mass unemployment in the West and Japan. The Soviet state could tighten the belt of hapless Russian consumers, take a temporary 'loss' by dumping (or withholding) cartel produce, and look forward to an eventual political 'profit' in the form of unrest in the streets of Tokyo, Paris and New York. There would also be an ideological bonus for a Soviet-dominated super-cartel. Russia's most aggressive adversary, mainland China, must also import most of its chrome, nickel, cobalt and platinum; thus, a Soviet resource war mounted against the West would also be a means whereby Moscow could delay China's modernisation and, with it, the up-grading of Chinese military forces on Russia's eastern frontier.

The 'Saudi Arabia of minerals' is what is called 'High Africa': Zaïre, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. This area, from the Transvaal to Shaba Province in Zaïre, produces most of the non-communist world's supply of chromium, cobalt, gold, platinum, diamonds, vanadium, uranium and germanium. The alternative sources of comparable size for most of these materials lie chiefly inside the Soviet Union. A workable Soviet-African cartel for these items (unlike one for bauxite and rubber, for example) is not unthinkable, for it could be held together by Cuban infantry and East German security police under Soviet auspices. It is argued, of course, that a cartel to control High Africa's minerals cannot succeed because individual African states would have to trade with the West to survive. This reasoning fails to recognize the possibility that a quasi-Marxist commonwealth in Africa could be integrated into the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) and exploited by the Warsaw Pact, in the same way that the Soviet Union has, in the past, exploited eastern Europe. The arrangement would not be efficient in Western terms nor would it benefit the African masses, but it might serve long enough to disrupt world trade and cripple the West. The state-trading ministries of Comecon, after all, have the bureaucratic know-how to organise commodity cartels and economic warfare, while the KGB and its associated secret police forces would answer to complaints from the African consumer. That Vietnam has become a *de facto* member of Comecon suggests that geographical distance from Russia is no obstacle to Soviet imperialism.

Given its proxy régimes in Angola and Moçambique, the Soviet Union is in an excellent position to interdict the western and eastern approaches to the sea-lanes around the Cape of Good Hope. South Africa's strategic position alone, quite apart from its mineral resources, makes it of vital importance to the United States and the West. Some 25 000 ships pass the Cape yearly, about half of which call at South African ports. These vessels carry 90 per cent of western Europe's oil, 70 per cent of its strategic minerals, 20 per cent of United States oil imports, and 25 per cent of western Europe's food. And the extensive South African railway



network currently moves a large proportion of the mineral production not only of South Africa, but also of Zaïre, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

A coalition of democracies, much more than of dictatorships, needs a transcendent vision that can lift diverse nations above the squabbles over trivial and parochial interests. Without an ennobling central mission, the endless pursuit of pluralism fragments the general good. At risk of being thought quixotic or utopian, therefore, let us offer a geo-political dream. Moscow's strategy is now inter-continental. By contrast, non-communist target states adhere to parochial defence concepts. In Asia the threat to Berlin is ignored; the



invasion of Afghanistan is underplayed in Europe; the conquest of Angola was overlooked by Washington. Yet the outward pressure of the Soviet empire is a common danger, which can best be met by concerted response.

To fill the vacuum left by the demise of the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (Seato) and Cento, we must summon to the southern oceans a new chain of naval alliances, fitted for an era of energy crisis and mineral scarcity. Instead of succumbing to creeping defeatism, in awe of Moscow's war machine, we must structure a consortium armed with the strengths of the high technologies of America, Europe and Japan, the oil reserves of Saudi Arabia, the mineral resources and strategic location of Australia and South Africa, the martial skills of Turkey, Pakistan and South Korea, and the naval traditions of Britain, France, the United States and Japan.

It is now more than 30 years since America helped transform world affairs by initiating the Marshall Plan and, with it, NATO. Americans and Europeans alike can take pride in the fact that few peacetime efforts can compare with the magnitude and success of that enterprise. Together, they rebuilt a shattered Europe, they shielded it from Russian aggression, and they helped lift Germany from the rubble of defeat to become a trusted and prosperous ally. In the ensuing years of peace, the West not only

Invasion of Afghanistan (previous page) has brought Moscow significantly closer to West's oil lifeline in Persian Gulf, and stimulated discussion of need for European intervention force in region. Fiasco of United States attempts to rescue hostages in Iran (above) emphasised lack of Western quick reaction forces in south west Asia since collapse of Central Treaty Organisation

renewed itself but also set about economic development in the Third World. In a sense, it has been living off the diplomatic capital of the Marshall Plan and NATO for three decades. NATO is still a blue chip alliance that must be preserved and sustained as the fulcrum for efforts towards stability elsewhere, but it now has vulnerable flanks. The world has changed greatly in 30 years. It is time for a new initiative of creative statesmanship.

The plan can be summed up in the term 'Tri-Oceanic Alliance'. (Dr Ray Cline, the executive director of World Power Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, prefers 'All Oceans Alliance'.) It is an updated mode of mutual security, requiring new military alliances, or less formal 'arrangements', on the part of key states on the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian oceans. Eventually, there might be a consortium of regional 'building block' pacts, a chain of naval agreements between sea-linked nations which are threatened directly by Soviet military power or by communist subversion and 'wars of national liberation' backed by Soviet proxies. Ideally, the Alliance should include such 'core' states as the United States, Canada and Brazil; Britain, France, Italy and West Germany; Saudi Arabia and Turkey; Japan, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Australia and New Zealand. One can think of other candidates: Argentina, Venezuela and Mexico, for example; Belgium, Spain and Portugal; Pakistan, the Sudan and Morocco; Singapore for her economic strength; the Philippines by virtue of historical ties and naval realities. Indeed, one would hope that Thailand and other Association of South East Asian Nations (Asean) states would eventually want to join the enterprise. Nigeria, Zaïre and other African states would be welcome partners, although one touchstone for membership would have to be a perception that Moscow rather than Washington is the seat of the new imperialism. (This hypothetical listing is not meant to reflect adversely on states not named. In some cases, for example Greece, Norway and the Netherlands, one fears that regardless of the desirability of their membership, domestic politics would inhibit their governments from, say, a military commitment to defend the Persian Gulf. If the political climate inside various states in time made possible the evolution of a wider geo-political role, the Tri-Oceanic Alliance should be ready to enlarge its membership.)

This initiative would repair the gaps left by the demise of Seato and Cento. It would likewise remedy a weakness in NATO's common defence that was obvious to General Charles de Gaulle as early as 1958. At that time the French president proposed to Mr Eisenhower and the British prime minister, Harold Macmillan, that the United States, Britain and France should co-ordinate allied action during crises on a scale far wider than the geographical limits established by the NATO treaty. De Gaulle's idea was rejected, but its logic carries even more force today, when pro-Soviet Marxist régimes in Angola and Moçambique dominate African shores on both sides of the oil route round the Cape of Good Hope.

A TRI-OCEANIC Alliance might also be the framework within which Israel and Egypt could find sufficient military and psychological security to consummate their own peace pact. Recognising the difficulties, one should also not exclude a formula by which the Alliance could serve as shield

and incentive to encourage further progress on racial matters in South Africa. Perhaps in the longer term one might even hope that India and mainland China might consider associate membership. Uncertainty as to the final shape and nature of the Tri-Oceanic Alliance should not, however, stand in the way of an immediate effort to enlist an 'executive group' of perhaps ten states whose combined manpower, technology and geography would enable them to block Soviet gambits.

The sheer mass of continental Russia overhangs the unprotected islands of Japan, the peninsula of western Europe and the sparsely populated oil states of the Persian Gulf. A dynamic, cohesive Soviet empire faces outwards towards its 'three fronts'. But those 'fronts' are not united in their response to the Soviet Union. NATO is under no obligation to defend the Persian Gulf. Japan and West Germany are both allies of the United States, but they bear no responsibility for the security of each other, although both are threatened by Russia. Nor do Japan and West Germany earmark any military forces to defend Kuwait and Saudi Arabia — on Russia's southern flank — even though their economies would collapse within six weeks of a loss of oil supplies from south west Asia. Out of economic necessity, as well as security, Japan and West Germany, allies of America, should also become allied to each other. In this way, jointly, stability in the Persian Gulf and along the African Cape route should be underpinned.

The Tri-Oceanic Alliance must not, however, be a form of Western paternalism. Its members would frankly acknowledge the Persian Gulf states as a major power in the world, accept Japan and other Asian states as equal partners, and welcome African and Latin American nations as fraternal peers. The Alliance could be the maritime NATO of the southern oceans. It would enable non-communist countries to offset the undeclared, Soviet-inspired 'resource war' in the southern hemisphere, and to provide a naval shield that would justify vast capital investment in the Third World. In this way, those nations would help others as they saved themselves. Just as NATO was the shield behind which Europe was rebuilt with the Marshall Plan, so the Tri-Oceanic Alliance could be the shelter for the next 50 years of development in the under-developed world. Part of its mission would be to defend members against Soviet economic warfare. But its objectives would include fostering international trade, the free market economy and capital flow for development. Members obviously would be free to trade anywhere, as are those of NATO; its purpose would be to checkmate Soviet imperialism, not to organise its own politico-military monopolies.

Such an alliance is perhaps the only structure big enough to:

- stop dangerous tremors from the political earthquake in Iran spreading to Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich but precarious governments in the Persian Gulf
- provide a 'framework of assurance' solid enough to enable Israel to make a lasting peace with Egypt and eventually reach a compromise with moderates in the Arab world
- bind Japan as securely to Australia, the United States and Asean as Europe binds West Germany inside NATO (for as Japan rearms, it must not conclude — on the premise of a weary America in retreat — that its best course is to play off Russia, China and America against each other)
- help redress the unfavourable military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The Tri-Oceanic Alliance would help deter Russia by forcing Moscow to worry about 'three fronts' that are interlinked
- introduce the means — say, its own volunteer legions — to meet Russia's use of Cuban and other proxies in Third World resource wars
- rally otherwise dispirited allies that now feel isolated and adrift, at the mercy of Soviet power and drive.

The Tri-Oceanic Alliance would confront Soviet power, spreading from its heartland towards targets at the rim, with a global grouping of military allies, not random regional groupings with no mutual defence obligation. In short, it could prove the long-term dream to revive collective courage to attack short-term problems: safeguarding American missile silos, perfecting cruise missiles for NATO allies, deploying the enhanced radiation weapon (the 'neutron bomb'), perhaps rescuing from the shelf a derivative of the B-1 bomber, the development of which was cancelled by the Carter administration; all actions that otherwise might seem hopeless in the shadow of the Russian war machine.

It must be recognised, also, that the threat to Third World stability and to NATO's economic flank does not stem only from Soviet warships and Cuban infantry. It arises in part from massive clandestine operations carried out by the KGB. Propaganda, psychological warfare, subversion and support for guerrilla conflict together constitute a major offensive system for the Soviet Union. The subversive 'software' helps prepare the ideological climate for low-risk projection of Soviet mercenaries into the belly of a target nation. The United



United States Navy (amphibious units on manoeuvres, above and right) would be crucial to projected Tri-Oceanic Alliance fleet. Japanese, Australian, Canadian and New Zealand warships have joined Americans on Pacific exercises, extending principle of Western collective security beyond boundaries of NATO

States needs to revitalise the CIA and, with its allies, re-enter the arena of trans-national politics. Many forms of so-called 'covert operations' are non-violent, as routine — and benign — as the provision of funds to politicians, labour leaders and editors who oppose communist takeovers in their own countries. It is a curious form of morality indeed that forbids the West to assist non-Marxists of the Third World in their political battles to maintain genuine independence from the myrmidons of the Russian empire. Happily, the mood in the United States Congress and among national security and intelligence chiefs in the Reagan administration now favours more resolute action against Soviet underground warfare.

The concept of a Tri-Oceanic Alliance must still be viewed as a dream at the edge of the horizon. But there is, fortunately, modest but growing support for the idea that collective security must be extended beyond the current boundaries of NATO. General de Gaulle argued the case in 1958; today, West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher speaks of Europe's energy flanks and the importance of sea power to protect them. The chaos in Iran, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and the Iraq-Iran war at least have stimulated talk of the need for a European intervention force in the Gulf. Early last year in the Pacific, Japan for the first time ventured into multi-national war



games, joining the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand in a naval exercise. The Asean states are starting to discuss military matters; and other Asian powers are floating the idea of a Pacific basin defence arrangement. An American would also be remiss in failing to note with approval the presence of a significant French fleet in the Indian Ocean and the success of the French Rapid Deployment Force in contributing to the stability of Zaïre, Tunisia and Saudi Arabia.

If no one imagines that non-communist governments are yet ready to support a vast new alliance, why bother to draft blueprints for a grand design so difficult to implement? Because man lives by political hope, as well as invulnerable ballistic missiles. Even to talk about the Tri-Oceanic Alliance is to offset defeatism. Instead of focusing on Russian strength and the decline of Western morale, why not remind the faint-hearted that the Tri-Oceanic Alliance would compound awesome advantages for our side? It would confer on the non-communist world at least a four-to-one advantage over the Soviet bloc in gross national product; up to 90 per cent of the world's scientific, engineering and management know-how, to the extent that this can be quantified; 60 per cent of the globe's oil reserves; 85 per cent of its food exports; and a three-to-one superiority in naval power.

Many will say that a Tri-Oceanic Alliance is either an impossible dream or, given the heavy — and rising — costs of modern navies, the road to economic ruin. One can only reply that in 1949 it was equally quixotic to imagine that a common market of extraordinarily prosperous nations could rise from the ashes of World War II in Europe. As to cost, it is true that America at first bore the brunt of launching NATO and the Marshall Plan; but a Tri-Oceanic Alliance in today's world has many potential partners of affluence and immense technical skills. The Alliance may be only a dream, but it is one sufficiently enticing to shift attention from Soviet successes towards the combined strengths of the non-communist nations. It recalls the wisdom of Sir Winston Churchill's observation that to bring forth a new alliance may weigh more in the balance of history than to win a battle by oneself. It is inherently absurd that the high technology societies of the West and Japan should yield military superiority to Russia. Worse, it would be a moral outrage if civilisations based on freedom and the rule of law should abdicate the future to the architects of the Gulag Archipelago. If a Tri-Oceanic Alliance can mobilise enough idealism and spirit to exercise the constructive options that lie between nuclear war and one-sided détente, the weaknesses in the Soviet system will compound themselves. Marxism inside the Soviet Union has long since lost its élan. Only our own lack of imagination and high purpose would permit the Politburo to gain further success for the shabby tyranny that it represents — one now manifest to many in the Third World as well as to the industrialised nations of the earth. ○